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CHAPTER 12 
Labor and Employment Law 
ALAN J. MCDONALD* 
§ 12.1. Introduction. The major labor and employment law cases de-
cided during the Survey year are divided, for the purposes of this section, 
into six broad categories. The first category includes those cases dealing 
with the enforcement of public sector arbitration awards under General 
Laws chapters 150E and 150C. The limitation period for petitioning to 
vacate labor arbitration awards is the subject of the second category. The 
third category of cases involves the reviewability of pre-hearing dismissal 
decisions of the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission under Gen-
eral Laws chapter 150E. The fourth category of cases examines the 
authority of the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission under General 
Laws chapter 31, the civil service law. The emerging area of wrongful 
discharge litigation is the focus of category five, and, finally, the ability 
of a public employer to require its employees to undergo lie detector 
tests is discussed in category six. 
In addition to the foregoing, during the Survey year the legislature 
enacted an important amendment to chapter 150E. That amendment, 
although relatively unpublicized, represents an important aid to public 
sector unions in the battle for power balance within the negotiations 
process. The following sections report and analyze these developments. 
§ 12.2. The Enforcement of Public Sector Arbitration Awards Under 
Chapters 150E and 150C. Perhaps encouraged by its success during the 
1985 Survey year at limiting the availability of arbitration as a forum for 
review of managerial decision-making within the public sector, 1 municipal 
employers launched an aggressive attack during the 1986 Survey year at 
the very heart of the contractual arbitration process by asking the Su-
preme Judicial Court to rule that teacher unions could not arbitrate the 
suspension or discharge of tenured public school teachers under a con-
tractual just cause standard. Specifically, school committees within three 
municipalities sought judicial review in separate proceedings seeking 
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§ 9.2, at 261-72, and Ross, Labor and Employment Law, 1981 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw, 
§ 7.5, at 181-85, for discussion of the nondelegation doctrine, and its limiting effect on the 
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vacation of arbitration awards arising out of standard just cause clauses 
contained within collective bargaining agreements negotiated pursuant to 
chapter 150E. These agreements reversed, in whole or in part, decisions 
by the committees to suspend or discharge tenured school teachers be-
cause of non-budgetary, performance related reasons. 2 In each case, the 
school committees asked the Court to declare that the arbitrator exceeded 
his or her authority by intruding into areas left by state law- particularly 
chapter 71, sections 37 and 42 - to the nondelegable discretion of the 
committees. 
Several years earlier, the Court had held in a trilogy of cases that a 
school committee's decision to grant or deny tenure was not a proper 
subject for arbitration, except where the decision was attacked only on 
grounds that pre-decisional evaluation procedures mandated by contract 
had not been followed. 3 This year, the Court disposed of the three current 
challenges in a new trilogy of cases, and all three cases were resolved 
against the committees, and in favor of the arbitrators' awards. 
In Old Rochester Regional Teacher's Club v. Old Dorchester Regional 
School District Committee,4 the school committee dismissed a tenured 
teacher with nineteen years service for allegedly pulling a student's hair 
and using foullanguage. 5 Following arbitration, which had been unsuc-
cessfully resisted by the school committee before both the superior court 
and the Appeals Court, the teacher's union sought enforcement of the 
arbitration award that had reduced the dismissal to a 30-day suspension 
and reinstated the teacher with back pay and benefits. The school com-
mittee opposed enforcement arguing that the termination was not arbitr-
able, and that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by substituting 
his judgment for that of the committee on a policy issue. 6 The Court 
rejected both arguments. 
With respect to arbitrability, the committee contended principally7 that 
2 An interesting, yet open question is whether a public employer that seeks to vacate an 
arbitration award under a just cause clause freely negotiated by such employer, on grounds 
that the clause illegally intrudes into its statutory powers, commits a prohibited practice 
under chapter 150E § 10(a)(l) and (5). It is at least arguable that such conduct constitutes 
bad faith bargaining, irrespective of the merits of the claim for vacation. 
3 See School Comm. of Danvers v. Tyman, 372 Mass. 106, 360 N.E.2d 877 (1977); Dennis-
Yarmouth Regional School Dist v. Dennis Teachers Ass'n, 372 Mass. 116, 360 N.E.2d 883 
(1977); and School Comm. of West Bridgewater v. West Bridgewater Teachers Ass'n, 372 
Mass. 121, 360 N.E.2d 886 (1977). 
4 398 Mass. 695, 500 N.E.2d 1315 (1986). 
5 /d. at 697, 500 N.E.2d at 1317. 
6Jd. 
7 The committee also argued that an order by the trial court to arbitrate was defective 
because that court had failed to make an underlying finding that an agreement to arbitrate 
had existed pursuant to the requirement of chapter 150C, § 2. The Court concluded that 
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it had no duty to arbitrate because its collective bargaining agreement 
had expired before it had voted upon the teacher's dismissal, and a new 
collective bargaining agreement, by its own terms non-retroactive, had 
not been executed until after such vote. Citing the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Nolde Bros. v. Local 358, Bakery and Confectionary 
Worker's Union, 8 the Court concluded that a public employer could be 
required to arbitrate after the expiration of its collective bargaining agree-
ment, so long as the dispute at issue rose under the agreement.9 Accord-
ingly, because the events precipitating the grievance arose while the 
agreement had been in effect, and the school committee had brought 
charges against the teacher prior to the expiration of the agreement, the 
Court found that the "dispute over the termination arose under the agree-
ment" and was arbitrable. 10 
With respect to the school committee's second major argument, the 
Court similarly demurred. In response to the contention that it should 
extend the nondelegability doctrine it had applied as a bar to the arbitra-
tion of tenure decisions in School Committee of Danvers v. Tyman, 11 to 
bar the arbitration of dismissal decisions as to already tenured teachers, 
the Court explicitly found the nondelegability doctrine inapplicable to the 
latter issue. The Court relied upon chapter 150E, section 8, 12 which 
provides for the enforcement of public sector arbitration awards under 
chapter 150C and establishes that arbitration, where elected, is to be the 
exclusive procedure for resolution of dismissal grievances notwithstand-
ing the judicial review provisions of the teacher tenure law, chapter 71, 
the lower court's order to arbitrate subsumed such a finding, and under Rule 52(a), MAss. 
R. C1v. P., that finding did not have to be stated. /d. at 698, 500 N.E.2d at 1318. 
8 430 u.s. 243, 249 (1977). 
9 Old Rochester Regional Teacher's Club, 398 Mass. at 699, 500 N.E.2d at 1318. 
10 /d. 
11 372 Mass. 106, 360 N.E.2d 877 (1977). 
12 G.L. c. 150E, § 8 states that: 
The parties may include in any written agreement a grievance procedure culminating 
in final and binding arbitration to be invoked in the event of any dispute concerning 
the interpretation or application of such written agreement. In the absence of such 
grievance procedure, binding arbitration may be ordered by the commission upon 
the request of either party; provided that any such grievance procedure shall, wher-
ever applicable, be exclusive and shall supersede any otherwise applicable grievance 
procedure provided by law; and further provided that binding arbitration hereunder 
shall be enforceable under the provisions of chapter one hundred and fifty C and 
shall, where such arbitration is elected by the employee as the method of grievance 
resolution, be the exclusive procedure for resolving any such grievance involving 
suspension, dismissal, removal or termination notwithstanding any contrary provi-
sions of section thirty-nine and forty-one to forty-five, inclusive, of chapter thirty-
one, section sixteen of chapter thirty-two, or sections forty-two through forty-three 
A, inclusive of chapter seventy-one. 
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sections 42 and 43. The Court concluded, therefore, that the legislature 
had intended to permit arbitration of dismissal grievances by tenured 
teachers. Because the legislature's intent to permit delegation of dismissal 
disputes to arbitration was so clearly expressed in chapter 150E, section 
8, the Court reasoned, there was no basis to invoke the nondelegability 
doctrine to bar arbitration. 
Alleged teacher misconduct was also at issue in School Committee of 
Waltham v. Waltham Teachers Association, 13 where the school commit-
tee suspended a tenured teacher without pay for 10 days for striking a 
student. Although the teacher admitted that he struck the student, he 
resisted the discipline on some unusual, albeit compelling, mitigating 
circumstances. 
Specifically, a thumb-tack had been placed by a student on the teach-
er's chair in his absence. When the teacher sat down the tack penetrated 
a testicle, causing the teacher to bolt out of the chair and strike another 
nearby student. When he discovered that the student he had struck was 
not the one who had left the tack on his chair, the teacher, in a flourish 
of frontier nobility, offered the struck student an opportunity to strike 
him back with a wooden pointer. The teacher then reported the entire 
episode to school authorities. After a subsequent hearing, the school 
committee imposed the suspension. 
The arbitrator, interpreting and applying a standard just cause clause14 
in the underlying collective bargaining agreement, concluded that the tO-
day suspension was not warranted and ordered that the teacher be made 
whole. 15 The superior court vacated the arbitrator's award on various 
theories, thereby providing the Supreme Judicial Court a wide ranging 
opportunity to comment on several aspects of the public sector arbitration 
process. 
Although agreeing with the superior court that the arbitrator's factual 
findings were arguably inconsistent, the .Court, relying upon its own case 
holdings, rejected such inconsistencies as an adequate basis for the lower 
court's vacation of the arbitration award. Finding that the arbitrator had 
answered the question submitted to him, the Court characterized as 
"unimportant" the possibility that his findings were factually or legally 
erroneous. 16 
13 398 Mass. 703, 500 N.E.2d 1312 (1986). 
14 The contract read in relevant part that "No tenured employee in a classification covered 
by this agreement will be discharged, disciplined, or reprimanded or reduced in rank or 
compensation without just cause;. just cause including but not limited to inefficiency, 
incapacity, conduct unbecoming such employee, or insubordination." I d. at 704, 500 N .E.2d 
at 1313. 
15 The arbitrator also invited the school committee to give the teacher a warning if it 
wished for the pointer incident. Id. 
16 ld. at 706, 500 N.E.2d at 1313, 1314. 
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The Court also disagreed with the superior court's conclusion that the 
award violated chapter 71, section 37G. In order for the award to have 
conflicted with that statute - which prohibits corporal punishment of 
public school students- the Court reasoned that the teacher's retaliatory 
attack would have to have been intentional. Because the arbitrator evi-
dently found the teacher's attack unintentional, there was no conflict 
with the corporal punishment statute, and no basis for vacation of the 
award. 
Finally, the Court rejected the notion advanced by the school commit-
tee, and adopted by the superior court, that an arbitrator's authority in 
a contractual teacher discipline case could be no broader than a court's 
authority in reviewing a statutory discipline case under chapter 71, sec-
tion 43A. 17 Describing the focus of judicial review of a teacher dismissal 
under section 43A as whether the action was "arbitrary, irrational, un-
reasonable, in bad faith, or irrelevant to the committee's task of operating 
a good school system, "18 the Court expressly ruled that a broader de 
novo review, complete with a full evidentiary hearing, was properly 
available in arbitration. The Court determined that the right to arbitrate 
granted by the legislature in chapter 150E, section 8, coupled with well 
established parameters of arbitration under a just cause standard, 19 com-
pelled a conclusion that a full and de novo hearing by an arbitrator was 
appropriate absent a lesser scope of review contained in the parties' own 
contract. 
The final case in the new trilogy, School Committee of Needham v. 
Needham Education Association,20 required the Court to review an 
award in which another arbitrator had reversed a school committee's 
decision to terminate a tenured teacher. The committee had fired that 
teacher for allegedly failing to meet minimum teaching standards. The 
arbitrator concurred with the committee's conclusion as to the teacher's 
performance, but faulted the committee for failing to provide adequate 
support for the teacher as he found to be required by the collective 
bargaining agreement. The arbitrator's award reflected his allocation of 
blame: he ordered the school committee to reinstate the teacher, but did 
not order backpay. 
17 Chapter 71, section 43A permits a tenured teacher to contest a dismissal by filing a 
timely complaint in the superior court. The court is required to affirm the dismissal if it 
finds that it was ''justified." 
18 /d. at 707, 500 N.E.2d at 1315 (citing Springgate v. School Comm. of Mattapoisett, ll 
Mass. App. Ct. 304, 308, 415 N.E.2d 888 (1981)). 
19 /d. at 708, 500 N.E.2d at 1315. The Court cited to HOLDEN, GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION, 
PORTRAIT OF A PROCESs-COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 382 (1979) 
and Griffin, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration A wards, reprinted in ARBITRATING LABOR 
CASES, at 204-05 (1974) as support for this proposition. 
20 398 Mass. 709, 500 N.E.2d 1320 (1986). 
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On appeal the Court considered (1) whether the arbitrator exceeded 
his authority by substituting his judgment for the school committee's on 
the matter of just cause, (2) whether the award drew its essence from 
the agreement, and (3) whether the order of reinstatement was a proper 
exercise of remedial authority. The holdings in the Old Rochester and 
Waltham cases compelled the Court's disposition of the first two issues. 
The Court reiterated that the legislature's enactment of chapter 150E, 
section 8, had authorized the arbitration of tenured teacher dismissals 
under a just cause clause, notwithstanding the more limited scope of 
authority available for judicial review of teacher dismissals under chapter 
71, section 43A. Moreover, under settled principles governing the judicial 
review of arbitration awards, the courts were not to interfere with an 
arbitrator's interpretation of a contract clause unless that interpretation 
clearly did not draw its essence from the contract. Holding that an award 
draw its essence from a collective bargaining agreement unless "the 
arbitrator's interpretations and conclusions are substantially implausible 
or irrational,"21 the Court had little difficulty in finding that the award 
had passed muster. 
The Court's resolution of the third issue was more intriguing. The 
grievants in Old Rochester and Waltham had been disciplined for alleged 
misconduct in the management of their students, rather than for the 
quality of their teaching. An opening existed, therefore, for school com-
mittees to argue, notwithstanding Old Rochester and Waltham, that the 
core educational responsibility granted them by state law precluded ar-
bitral interference in the latter context. The Needham plaintiffs in fact 
made this argument, initially in the superior court where the award had 
been confirmed, and again on appeal. 22 
The superior court determined that the discharge was arbitrable be-
cause the school committee's contractual violations were procedural 
within the meaning of the Supreme Judicial Court's earlier decision in 
School Committee of West BridgewaterY In that case the Court upheld 
the reinstatement of a nontenured teacher by an arbitrator because, as 
determined by the arbitrator, the school committee had failed to follow 
pre-dismissal evaluation procedures contained in the teacher's collective 
bargaining agreement. In so holding, the Court created an exception to 
the rule it had established by a decision of the same date in School 
Committee of Danvers v. Tyman, 24 where, applying the nondelegability 
doctrine, it held nonarbitrable a school committee decision to dismiss, 
21 /d. at 713, 500 N.E.2d at 1323. 
22Jd. 
23 372 Mass. 121, 360 N.E.2d 886 (1977). 
24 372 Mass. 106, 360 N.E.2d 877 (1977). 
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and thereby deny tenure to, a third year teacher. By resolving the Need-
ham case on the basis of the West Bridgewater exception, the superior 
court's decision could actually be read to have upheld the Tyman rule, 
and extend that rule by implication to the discharge of a tenured teacher 
for performance related reasons. 
On appeal, although it noted the limited basis of the superior court 
decision, the Court neither agreed nor disagreed expressly with the ra-
tionale. By its choice of broad language to support its confirmation of 
the arbitration award, however, the Court appeared to endorse the ar-
bitrability of tenured teacher discharge cases irrespective of whether 
those cases involved procedural or substantive issues, and whether the 
substantive issues involved teacher misconduct or the quality of teacher 
performance. In this regard, again relying upon chapter 150E, section 8, 
the Court concluded that the legislature had granted broad authority for 
arbitrators to resolve discharge grievances, including those of tenured 
teachers, and had contemplated that reinstatement would be ordered 
where the evidence indicated that such remedy was appropriate. "To 
hold otherwise," the Court observed, "would seriously impair the entire 
arbitration process. "25 Although it would have been clearer had the Court 
expressly adopted or rejected the superior court's procedural violation 
analysis, the failure to adopt that analysis, the broad language supportive 
of the arbitration process, and the contemporaneous decisions in Old 
Rochester and Waltham suggest quite strongly that an arbitrator may 
lawfully overrule a school committee's performance-based decision dis-
charging a tenured teacher and reinstate such teacher, notwithstanding 
the nondelegability doctrine. 
In summary, the new teacher trilogy was a breath of fresh air for 
teacher unions as it reinforced the viability of arbitration as a mechanism 
for resolution of discharge cases in the public education sector. Although 
questions surfaced during the 1985 Survey year26 over the Court's com-
mitment to arbitration within the public sector, the Court returned on its 
decisional arc in the 1986 Survey year to a position more sympathetic to 
the arbitration process. Whether the case law will swing back in the nea,r 
future is uncertain. It will, however, have ample opportunity to do so, 
as the legislature's failure to have yet clearly resolved the relationship 
between chapter 150E and pre-existing statutory provisions related to the 
obligations and prerogatives of public management will continue to spawn 
litigation from advocates on both sides who are uncertain what to make 
of case law fashioned more by the judicial juggling of competing statutory 
goals than by logical and progressive legal reasoning. 
25 398 Mass. at 714, 500 N.E.2d at 1324. 
26 See Labor and Employment, 1985 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW, at 26 et seq. 
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§ 12.3. The Timeliness of Applications to Vacate Arbitration Awards 
Under Chapter 150C. Jurisdiction for judicial review of private sector 
labor arbitration awards has for many years been provided by chapter 
150C. In 1973, the legislature enacted chapter 150E, section 8. This 
statute provided that binding arbitration in the public sector would also 
be subject to judicial review under chapter 150C. 
Section 11(a) of chapter 150C permits a party in the arbitration process 
to apply to the superior court for an order vacating an award upon certain 
enumerated, albeit narrow, circumstances. Furthermore, section ll(b) 
states that an application to vacate "shall be made within thirty days 
after delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant .... " Upon simple 
reading, section 11(b) seemed to have created a limitation period for all 
actions to vacate arbitration awards arising out of collective bargaining 
agreements negotiated pursuant to chapter 150E. In 1983, however, the 
Appeals Court ruled that the thirty-day limitation period established by 
section ll(b) did not apply to petitions to vacate that contended that the 
arbitrator did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute in question. 1 The 
Appeals Court grounded its decision upon comments made by the Su-
preme Judicial Court, in a string of commercial and labor arbitration 
cases dating back over forty years, to the effect that "the question 
whether the award was in excess of the authority conferred on arbitrators 
is always open for review. "2 During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial 
Court had an opportunity to review that Appeals Court's decision. 
In Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority, 3 the Court repudiated the exception to section 
ll(b) that the Appeals Court had created. Local589 involved an under-
lying work jurisdictional dispute among two groups of employees and the 
MBTA. When the MBTA denied the work to the maintenance employees 
represented by Local589, that union sought relief in arbitration pursuant 
to a contract clause that purported to guarantee the work to its members. 
The arbitrator agreed with the union and ordered payment of damages 
by the MBTA to the affected employees. The MBTA neither complied 
with the award nor moved to vacate it. Upon expiration of the thirty-
day period in section ll(b), the union sued for enforcement of the award.4 
§ 12.3 1 Painters Local No. 257 v. Johnson Industrial Painting Contractors, 16 Mass. 
App. Ct. 67, 448 N.E.2d 1307 (1983). 
2 Painters Local, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 72,448 N.E.2d at 1310 (emphasis supplied) (citing 
M.S. Kelliher Co. v. Wakefield, 346 Mass. 645,647, 195 N.E.2d 330 (1964)); J.F. Fitzgerald 
Coast Co. v. Southbridge Water Supply Co., 304 Mass. 130, 134, 23 N.E.2d 165 (1939); 
Sheahan v. School Committee of Worcester, 359 Mass. 702, 709-11, 270 N.E.2d 912 (1971); 
and Greene v. Marl & Sons Floor Co., 362 Mass. 560, 562, 289 N.E.2d 860 (1972). 
3 397 Mass. 426, 491 N.E.2d 1053 (1986). 
4 Chapter 150C, section 10 provides, "Upon application of a party, the superior court 
shall confirm an award, unless within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are urged 
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The MBTA argued in the superior court that the arbitrator exceeded his 
jurisdiction. In its view, the award interlered with and was superseded 
by chapter 581 of the Acts of 1980, which had amended General Laws 
chapter 161A, section 19- the law governing collective bargaining for 
MBTA unions- by restricting collective bargaining over certain inherent 
management rights. Siding with the MBTA, the superior court vacated 
the award. On direct appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the union 
argued, inter alia, that the superior court should have confirmed the 
award because the MBTA failed to seek vacation within thirty days of 
its receipt. 
Citing the need for prompt disposition of arbitration proceedings and 
for finality or arbitration awards, the Court agreed with the union. Ac-
knowledging its prior statements that jurisdictional questions are "always 
open" for review, the Court explained that such references described the 
scope of judicial review available where jurisdiction was at issue, rather 
than the time frame in which applicants could move applications to 
vacate. 5 Having undercut the rationale of the Appeals Court's contrary 
decision, the Court disallowed any exception to the plain language of 
section 11(b).6 Accordingly, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the 
judgment of the superior court and confirmed the award. 
The Court's decision is sound. Allowing the exception for jurisdictional 
issues to stand would encourage the losing side in arbitration to procras-
tinate in complying with or contesting an award, knowing that it could 
always litigate the arbitrator's authority. Moreover, absent the application 
of section 11(b), there would arguably be no limitation period governing 
jurisdictional attacks on arbitration awards, and, therefore, no finality to 
the arbitration process. That possibility, together with the plain wording 
of section 11(b), strongly supports the Court's decision. 
§ 12.4. The Right to Judicial Review of Labor Relations Commission 
Determinations Under Chapter 150E, Section 11. Chapter 150E, section 
11 of the General Laws, authorizes the Massachusetts Labor Relations 
Commission to investigate complaints of prohibited practice brought 
against a public employer under chapter 150E, section 10(a) and against 
a public employee organization under chapter 150E, section 10(b). 1 When 
for vacating, modifying or correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed as 
provided in Sections 11 and 12." 
5 397 Mass. at 430, 491 N.E.2d at 1056. 
6 /d. at 431, 491 N.E.2d at 1057 (" ... all challenges to an arbitrator's award must be 
brought within the time frame specified by the statute.")(emphasis supplied). 
§ 12.4 1 Section 10(a) states, It shall be prohibited practice for a public employer or its 
designated representative to: (1) interfere, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise 
of any right guaranteed under this chapter; (2) dominate, interfere, or assist in the formation, 
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in its investigation the Commission finds probable cause to believe that 
an employee has violated section 10, it may issue a formal complaint and 
hold a hearing thereon. Chapter 150E, section 11 unquestionably provides 
for judicial review ofthe Commission's decision following such a hearing. 
The statute states that "[a]ny party aggrieved by a final order of the 
commission may institute proceedings for judicial review in the appeals 
court within thirty days after receipt of said order." 
Open to question, however has been whether any right to judicial 
review exists over complaints dismissed for lack of probable cause prior 
to any hearing by the Commission. The Commission, arguing that post 
investigation dismissals do not constitute final orders within the meaning 
of the above quoted language of section 11, consistently has asserted that 
such dismissals are, unless it has clearly exceeded its statutory authority 
or abused its discretion, nonreviewable. 2 During the Survey Year the 
Commission had two opportunities to make that argument to the Supreme 
Judicial Court. On both occasions, the Court disagreed. 
In Lyons v. Labor Relations Commission,3 Lyons, a public employee, 
was covered by a collective bargaining agreement between his employer 
and an employee organization. That agreement contained an agency fee 
clause which required all nonmembers of the employee organization to 
pay an agency fee equal to union membership dues. 4 Lyons, a nonmem-
ber of the employee organization, refused to pay the agency fee. Instead 
he filed a prohibited practice charge with the Labor Relations Commis-
sion, as authorized by Commission regulations,5 protesting the amount 
existence, or administration of any employee organization; (3) discriminate in regard to 
hiring, tenure, or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage mem-
bership in any employee organization; (4) discharge or otherwise discriminate against any 
employee because he has signed or filed an affidavit, petition, or complaint or given any 
information or testimony under this chapter, or because he has formed, joined, or chose to 
be represented by an employee organization; (5) refuse to bargain collectively in good faith 
with the exclusive representative as required in section six; (6) refuse to participate in good 
faith in the mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration procedures set forth in sections eight 
and nine; 
(b) It shall be a prohibited practice for an employee organization or its designated agent 
to: (1) interfere, restrain, or coerce any employer or employee in the exercise of any right 
guaranteed under this chapter; (2) refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with the public 
employer, if it is an exclusive representative as required in section six; (3) refuse to 
participate in good faith in the mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration procedures set forth 
in sections eight and nine. 
2 This position is consistent with the practice under the National Labor Relations Act, 
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., where the dismissal of an unfair labor practice charge 
after investigation by the General Counsel has been universally held to be nonreviewable. 
3 397 Mass. 498, 492 N.E.2d 343 (1986). 
4 /d. at 499, 492 N.E.2d at 344. 
5 See 402 MASS. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 402, §§ 17.00-17.16 (1982). 
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of the fee and asking the Commission to determine the amount that the 
organization lawfully could assess.6 He filed charge, however, seventeen 
days after the expiration of the forty-five day limitation period established 
by 402 CMR 17.00(2). The Commission dismissed the charge without 
hearing as untimely, and Lyons sought relief in the Appeals Court. 
Consistent with its contention that pre-hearing dismissals are not final 
orders within the meaning of section 11, the Commission refused to 
assemble the record for transfer of the case to the Appeals Court. Lyons 
unsuccessfully sought relief over the Commission's refusal to assemble 
the record from a single justice of the Appeals Court. Subsequently, the 
full Appeals Court reversed the single justice and ordered the record 
assembled. Although it concluded that it had jurisdiction over an appeal 
from the pre-hearing dismissal of the charge in this case, the court re-
jected Lyons' claim that the forty-five day limitation period for filing a 
prohibited practice charge over an agency fee was unconstitutional, and 
upheld the dismissal of his charge.7 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted further review on both issues 
considered by the Appeals Court. On the jurisdictional issue, it upheld 
the Appeals Court's decision. The Court found that agency fee challenges 
were constitutionally grounded because they involved an employee's first 
amendment right to prevent a union from spending his money to promote 
political issues with which he did not agree. The Court recognized a need 
to construe the section 11 right to judicial review as broadly as possible. 8 
The Court was concerned about the constitutionality of a mandatory 
agency fee clause which was not subject to meaningful judicial review. 
It concluded, therefore, that treating the pre-hearing dismissal of Lyons' 
charge by the Commission as a final order within the meaning of chapter 
150E, section 11 was consistent with and essential to its prior opinion in 
Greenfield, a case regarding the constitutionality of chapter 150E, section 
12.9 
The Court reversed the Appeals Court with respect to the forty-five 
day limitation period for contesting agency fees at the Commission under 
402 CMR § 17.06(2). The Court recognized a further constitutional con-
sideration surrounding a contractual agency fee requirement: the need 
for dissenting employees to have a fair chance for evaluating the impact 
6 The constitutionality of chapter 150E, section 12, which authorizes the assessment of 
agency fees in public sector collective bargaining agreements, was affirmed by the Supreme 
Judicial Court in School Committee of Greenfield v. Greenfield Education Association, 385 
Mass. 70, 431 N.E.2d 180 (1982). 
7 See Lyons, 397 Mass. at 500, 492 N.E.2d at 344. 
8 !d. at 501, 492 N.E.2d at 345. 
9 School Comm. of Greenfield v. Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, 385 Mass. 70,431 N.E.2d 180 
(1982). 
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of the agency fee on their free speech rights, and to act upon those 
evaluations. The Court found that the forty-five day period "greatly 
circumscribed"10 that opportunity. 
Of particular importance to the Court in assessing the adequacy of the 
forty-five day limitation period was the existence of a six month limitation 
peri0d for all other prohibited practice charges filed with the Commis-
sion. 11 Stating that the disparate limitation period would be problematic 
"even if a forty-five day limitation period for agency fee challenges were 
constitutionally adequate when viewed in isolation,"12 the Court ex-
pressly concluded that such a period was unconstitutional on equal pro-
tection grounds. Therefore, it directed the Commission to extend the 
same six month limitation period to agency fee charges that it extends to 
all other charges. 
The Supreme Judicial Court also examined the meaning of the term 
"final order" within chapter 150E, section 11 in Boston Housing Authority 
v. Labor Relations Commission. 13 There, the Commission dismissed a 
strike investigation petition filed by the Boston Housing Authority under 
chapter 150E, section 9AI4 after concluding that such section was in-
applicable to housing authorities in light of chapter 121B, section 29. 15 
The Authority appealed to the Appeals Court, and the Supreme Judicial 
Court took the case on its own motion. 
The Commission again resisted judicial review on grounds that chapter 
150E, section 11 restricted such review to post-hearing dismissals by the 
commission, and/or that section 9A dismissals were not included under 
10 Lyons, 397 Mass. at 504, 492 N.E.2d at 347. 
11 See MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 402, § 15.03. 
12 397 Mass. at 504 n.6, 492 N.E.2d at 347 n.6. 
13 398 Mass. 715, 500 N.E.2d 802 (1986). 
14 Chapter 150E, section 9A provides, 
(a) No public employee or employee organization shall engage in a strike and no 
public employee or employee organization shall induce, encourage or condone any 
strike, work stoppage, slowdown or witholding of services by such public employees. 
(b) Whenever a strike occurs or is about to occur the employer shall petition the 
commission to make an investigation. If, after the investigation, the commission 
determines that any provision of paragraph (a) of this section has been or is about 
to be violated, it shall immediately set requirements that must be complied with, 
including but not limited to instituting appropriate proceedings in the superior court 
for the county wherein such violation has occurred or is about to occur for enforce-
ment of such requirements. 
"Chapter 121B, section 29 provides, "A housing authority shall bargain collectively with 
labor organizations representing its employees and may enter into agreements with such 
organizations. Notwithstanding any provision of Jaw to the contrary the provisions of 
sections four, ten and eleven of chapter one hundred and fifty E shall apply to said 
authorities and trier employees." The Commission had concluded that since section 9A 
had not been included by reference in this provision, the legislature had not intended that 
such section apply to housing authorities. 
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the section 11 right to judicial review. The Court, however, determined 
that the case was properly before it irrespective of the section 11 argu-
ments.16 Because the Authority was contesting the Commission's juris-
diction over the labor dispute rather than a ruling made by the Commis-
sion on the merits, it could have done so, the Court reasoned, by way 
of a complaint for declaratory judgment under chapter 231A. 
Apparently treating the underlying action as one for declaratory relief, 
the Court considered the Commission's jurisdiction over the Authority. 
In that regard it rejected the Commission's interpretation as to the effect 
of chapter 121B, section 29, holding instead that chapter 150E, as a later, 
comprehensive enactment in the area of public sector labor relations, 
prevailed over any inconsistent provision of the former, more specific 
statute. The case was remanded to the Commission for consideration of 
the Authority's strike investigation petition under section 9A. 
Read together, these two cases seriously question whether the ex-
tremely limited right under federal labor law to obtain judicial review of 
a pre-hearing dismissal of an unfair labor practice charge by the General 
Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board applies with equal force 
to judicial review of pre-hearing dismissals by the Commission of parallel 
prohibited practice charges. Although the Commission undoubtedly 
would argue that Lyons, because of its unconstitutional implications, 
supports a right to review of agency fee challenges only, that conclusion 
does not follow from a careful reading of the Court's opinion. 
The Court was concededly influenced by the constitutional concerns 
underlying agency fee challenges when it interpreted the term "final 
order" under chapter 150E, section 11, to include the dismissal by the 
Commission of Lyons' prohibited practice chargeY To concede that the 
Court was motivated by constitutional considerations in agency fee cases 
to construe section 11 review rights broadly does not, however, concede 
that dismissals by the Commission of other classes of prohibited practice 
charges are not also final orders entitled to judicial review. Indeed, now 
that the Supreme Judicial Court has broadly construed section 11 to 
permit judicial review of pre-hearing dismissals by the Commission in at 
least one class of charges, it necessarily follows that section 11 permits 
such review for all classes of charges. Stated another way, when faced 
with a choice between declaring section 11 unconstitutional for failing to 
provide meaningful judicial review of agency fee challenges, and uphold-
ing section 11 by construing the term "final order" broadly enough to 
encompass pre-hearing dismissals by the Commission, the Court opted 
16 Boston Housing Authority, 398 Mass. at 717, 500 N.E.2d at 803, 804. 
17 See Lyons, 397 Mass. at 501, 492 N.E.2d at 345 where the Court noted that "[T]he 
constitutional nature of such agency fee complaints necessarily informs our interpretation 
of the term 'final orders' ... " 
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for the latter approach. That approach fits more comfortably with simple 
logic than does the hypothesis that the legislature intended the single 
term "final order" to mean one thing with respect to constitutionally 
grounded prohibited practice charges, and altogether another with regard 
to all other charges. 
The foregoing conclusion finds further support in Boston Housing Au-
thority. Although dealing with a section 9A strike investigation petition 
rather than with a prohibited practice charge, and although not even 
expressly finding that pre-hearing dismissals of section 9A charges were 
final orders under section 11, 18 the Court did observe that "[t]here is no 
doubt that the Commission's decision in the present case was in a sense 
'final' as it dismissed the petition. "19 Whether this observation will be 
extended into a holding that pre-hearing dismissals of both strike inves-
tigation petitions and prohibited practice charges are subject to judicial 
review awaits (1) an aggressive litigant who (2) has a Commission dis-
missal letter in hand. As both ingredients are ubiquitous, the answer 
should come relatively soon.20 
§ 12.5. The Authority of the Civil Service Commission Under Chapter 
31 Section 4). During the Survey year, the Appeals Court twice reviewed 
decisions of the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission at the request 
of a muni9ipal employee. Both cases involved the City of Boston, the 
reinstatement by the Commission of public safety officers discharged for 
serious misconduct, and reversal of Commission orders by the court. 
In Police Commissioner of Boston v. Civil Service Commission, 1 an on 
duty police officer had allegedly been drinking alcohol and engaging in 
sexual intercourse with an intoxicated woman in his protective custody. 2 
As a result of those allegations the police department filed two specifi-
cations against the officer. The first specification charged that the officer's 
conduct violated departmental rules by engaging in conduct unbecoming 
18 As noted supra, the Court treated the case as one for declaratory relief under chapter 
231 A rather than for review under section 11. 
19 Boston Housing Authority, 398 Mass. at 717, 500 N.E.2d at 803. 
20 There are countervailing arguments as to the reading of section 11 to be sure. Certainly 
it can be contended that judicial review of pre-hearing dismissals could effectively clog the 
system and render the Commission impotent to administer the law, a result presumably 
not intended by the legislature. Moreover, it can be argued that the legislature anticipated 
that judicial review would be as limited as that available under the parallel federal statute. 
But see Lyons v. Labor Relations Commission 19 Mass. App. Ct. 562 n.8, 476 N.E.2d 243 
n.8 (1985) where the court disputed, without deciding, the Commission's contention that 
the federal analogy was apposite. 
§ 12.5 1 22 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 494 N.E.2d 27 (1986). 
2 The officer allegedly had taken the woman to a private club during his evening meal 
break where the misconduct occured. Id. at 366, 494 N.E.2d at 29. 
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the department, by exercising unreasonable judgment, and by using al-
cohol on duty. Apparently in reliance upon accusations of rape later 
made by the woman in question, the second specification charged that 
the sexual intercourse was unlawful. 
Following a departmental hearing, a hearing officer relied upon the 
failure of a grand jury to indict the officer for rape, and dismissed the 
second specification. He found the officer guilty of the first specification, 
however, and recommended that the police commissioner impose an 
eighteen month suspension as punishment. The police commissioner re-
jected the recommendation and discharged the officer. The letter of dis-
missal from the police commissioner to the officer referred to conduct 
under both specifications as justifications for the discharge. 3 The officer 
appealed to the Commission pursuant to chapter 31, section 43. 4 
After a hearing, the Commission ordered the police commissioner to 
reduce the discharge to an eighteen month suspension. The Commission 
apparently based its decision on its view that the second specification 
had not been proven and that the evidence demonstrated that the inter-
course had apparently been consensual, and, thus, not unlawful. 
The police commissioner appealed the Commission's decision arguing 
that by modifying the penalty, the Commission had erroneously substi-
tuted its judgment for his own. The superior court affirmed the Commis-
sion's decision, finding that the second specification had not been proven, 
and characterizing the police commissioner's contention that discharge 
was imposed on the basis of each specification independently as a "post 
hoc" statement. 5 
In a stinging decision, the Appeals Court reversed. The court com-
mented variously that the "commission's decision ... was based upon 
a profound misunderstanding of the role of a police officer,"6 that the 
officer "engaged in outrageous conduct inimical to the most fundamental 
obligations imposed by reason of his position of police officer, a position 
of special trust, "7 and that the officer was not "fit to return to duty and 
once again hold the trust of the public. "8 Concluding that the police 
commissioner's contention that the officer's termination was warranted 
3 With respect to the second specification the commissioner noted that "[T]here was 
evidence presented that the person ... did not consent to the sexual intercourse." Id. at 
368, 494 N.E.2d at 30. 
4 Chapter 31, section 41 provides that "Except for just cause and except in accordance 
with the provisions of this paragraph, a tenured employee shall not be discharged .... " 
Section 43 permits review of a discharge decision by the Commission to determine if" .. . 
there was just cause for (the) action .... " 
5 Police Commissioner of Boston, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 370, 494 N.E.2d at 31. 
6 !d. 
7 ld. at 371, 494 N.E.2d at 32. 
8 !d. 
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independently on each specification "had been made clear" and was not 
a "post hoc" rationalization,9 the court labeled the Commission's modi-
fication of the penalty as "capricious" and as a "substantial error of 
law."10 The Appeals Court set aside the Commission's decision, and 
affirmed the police commissioner's decision in its entirety. 
In th'e second case, Fire Commissioner of Boston v. Joseph, 11 a fire-
fighter was discharged following adverse findings by the fire 
commissioner12 after a departmental hearing in which the firefighter had 
been charged with aiding in the unlawful burning of a building. At a 
subsequent hearing before a hearing officer of the Civil Service Commis-
sion, testimony was adduced from two witnesses - co-owners of the 
building - that the firefighter had admitted to them participation in the 
arson. Excluding other hearsay evidence tending to incriminate the fire-
fighter, the hearing officer ruled that although the testimony of the two 
witnesses "was credible," it was "insufficient to satisfy the burden of the 
Appointing Authority,"13 because the witnesses were business partners 
with an obvious interest in the entire affair. Furthermore, there was no 
corroboration offered to support their second-hand testimony. Because 
this evidence was, in his view, insufficient to sustain a prima facie case, 
the hearing officer never explicitly resolved the credibility issue presented 
by the firefighter's testimonial denial of the admissions attributed to him 
by the co-owners. 
The Civil Service Commission adopted the hearing officer's conclu-
sions, and ordered the firefighter reinstated. From that order the fire 
commissioner appealed. Once again, the Appeals Court reversed the 
Commission. 
The court viewed the scope of its review in the nature of certiorari -
requiring it to "correct only those errors which have resulted in manifest 
injustice to the plaintiff or which have adversely affected the real interests 
of the general public. " 14 The court concluded, therefore, that the hearing 
officer and the commission had so erred by requiring corroboration of 
the credible testimony offered by the fire commissioner's witnesses, and 
by failing to use that testimony to determine that the preponderance of 
evidence15 supported the fire commissioner's decision. Specifically, the 
9 /d. at 370 n.8, 494 N.E.2d at 31 n.8. 
10 /d. 
11 23 Mass. App. Ct. 76, 498 N.E.2d 1368 (1986). 
12 The hearing was held pursuant to chapter 31, section 41. 
13 Fire Commissioner of Boston, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 81, 198 N.E.2d at 1271. 
14 /d. at 82, 498 N.E.2d at 1372. The fire commissioner has no right to appeal from an 
adverse ruling pursuant to chapter 31, section 22 which provides for employee appeal only; 
accordingly the commissioner had filed an appeal in the nature of certiorari pursuant to 
chapter 249, section 4. 
15 Chapter 31, section 43 provides in relevant part that: "If the Commission by a prepon-
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court ruled that the testimony offered by the co-owners was admissible 
hearsay under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule. 16 Accord-
ingly, if that testimony was believable, as apparently the hearing officer 
found it to be, then even without corroboration it should have sustained 
the fire commissioner's burden of proof. Describing the hearing officer's 
error as purely legal, and the officer's misconduct too substantial to 
warrant modification of the discharge, the court saw no need to remand 
for further hearing at the administrative level. 17 It ordered the fire com-
missioner's decision reinstated. 
For better or worse, the foregoing decisions appear result oriented. 
The Appeals Court palpably bristled at the prospect of either employee 
returning to a public safety position given the nature of their alleged 
misconduct. Moreover, in the police case the court's conclusion- that 
the police commissioner's contention that he would have discharged the 
officer on each of the specifications independently was not a post hoc 
statement - is difficult to reconcile. Its refusal to remand the fire case 
to the Commission for further hearing or argument on the basis of some 
less than explicit language regarding credibility determinations in the 
hearing officer report, is also difficult to explain, except in terms of result 
orientation. Furthermore, its decisions precluding the return of the two 
employees contrast starkly with the court's 1985 decision in Town of 
Dedham v. Civil Service Commission 18 in which it upheld a Commission 
decision reducing a mentally retarded employee's discharge to an eigh-
teen month suspension, notwithstanding uncontroverted evidence that 
the employee was chronically absent and had orally and physically as-
saulted his superiors. It is difficult to reconcile the court's willingness to 
defer to the employer's discretion in the 1986 cases, but not in the 1985 
case - a case in which the facts were more sympathetic to the employee 
- except on the basis of how their results fit the court's qualitative value 
judgments. 
Although it is difficult to argue with the notion that a police officer 
who enjoys sex with a ward while on duty might not be suitable for his 
position, or that a firefighter who sets rather than extinguishes fires ought 
not to be a firefighter, the relevant inquiry is what role the Appeals Court 
ought to play in the disposition of such cases. Where the Civil Service 
Commission and the superior court both found that the police commis-
sioner's contentions relative to his reliance on each specification inde-
pendently were post hoc, it is at least arguable that the Appeals Court 
derance of the evidence determines that there was just cause for an action taken against 
such (employee) it shall affirm that action .... " 
16 The court cited LIACOS, MASSACHUSI:TTS EVIDENCE 276 (5th ed. 1981). 
17 Fire Commissioner of Boston, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 82, 498 N.E.2d at 1373. 
18 21 Mass. App. Ct. 904, 483 N.E.2d 836 (1985). 
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overstepped its role by categorically rejecting the post hoc analysis with-
out pointing to specific record evidence to support its conclusion. A 
similar argument can be made with respect to the court's failure to have 
remanded the firefighter's case for further consideration after overturning 
an evidentiary ruling of the administrative hearing officer. 
In any event, the Appeals Court forcefully has served notice that it 
will not permit technical arguments to prevail over employer discretion 
in civil service discharge cases involving serious breaches of the public 
trust. The message to employee litigants is clear; the election of a civil 
service forum has become inferior to arbitration given the relative stan-
dards of review adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court in the new teacher 
trilogy and the Appeals Court in the civil services cases. 
§ 12.6. Discharge of an At-Will Employee for Reasons Which Violate 
Public Policy. Although the Supreme Judicial Court had implied in earlier 
cases 1 that it would entertain a cause of action alleging that an employee-
at-will had been discharged for reasons which violated public policy, it 
had never been explicitly presented with such a case. The issue was 
concretely presented during the Survey year in DeRose v. Putnam Man-
agement Co., ]nc. 2 DeRose alleged that his employer, a computer man-
agement company, discharged him for refusing to testify in the theft trial 
of a co-employee. A superior court judge denied the employer's motion 
for a directed verdict, holding that DeRose could recover if the jury 
believed that his discharge violated public policy. 3 The jury, in turn, 
reached a verdict of $9,000 for DeRose on a contract theory. DeRose 
appealed the adequacy of the verdict and his employer cross-appealed. 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted a request for direct appellate review. 4 
The Court affirmed, observing that the majority rule in other jurisdic-
tions, and the predominant view in legal periodicals, favored judicial 
relief for an employee discharged in violation of public policy. In doing 
so, the Court expressly extended its prior case law, which awarded relief 
to at-will employees only where the employer had discharged them in a 
bad faith effort to gain an unfair financial advantage,5 to discharge in 
§ 12.6 'See Cort v. Bristol Myers, 385 Mass. 300, 303, 431 N.E.2d 908, 910 (1982) 
where the Court, citing Gram v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 
(1981), stated that "termination of at-will employment could give rise to a claim where the 
reason for the discharge was contrary to public policy." 
2 398 Mass. 205, 496 N.E.2d 428 (19~6). 
3 /d. at 206, 496 N.E.2d at 429. 
•[d. 
5 See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). 
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violation of public policy "even in cases where the employer does not 
gain a financial advantage. "6 
Regarding DeRose's claim that he was entitled to recover punitive 
damages, the Court noted that the case had been tried on a contract 
theory, and that punitive damages were unavailable in contract. 7 For the 
same reason, the Court also rejected DeRose's appellate claim for dam-
ages grounded in tort. Describing the tor:t damages as belated, the Court 
refused to consider it, albeit acknowledging that other jurisdictions have 
allowed tort damages in public policy discharge cases.8 Finally, with 
respect to DeRose's claim for additional damages in contract, the Court 
viewed that claim, under the circumstances, as a "quarrel with the dam-
ages awarded by the jury," expressed "no opinion as to the proper 
measure of contract damages in a case such as this. "9 
DeRose is significant both for what it decided and for what it did not 
decide. In the former respect it reflects the latest step in the Court's 
cautious, but definite, inroad into the employment-at-will doctrine. 10 Now 
having accepted a wrongful discharge case where the public policy fa-
voring truthful testimony in a judicial proceeding has been sufficiently 
implicated, it is expected that in coming years the Court will extend 
DeRose to other employment-at-will discharges which similarly implicate 
other important public policies. Although it is difficult to specify the 
parameters of the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doc-
trine, it is fair to assume that many of the fact patterns involved in other 
public policy cases decided in other jurisdictions, and cited at footnote 
6 in Gram v. Liberty Mutual, 11 will fall within the exception. Thus, it is 
likely that the DeRose principles would cover, for example, termination 
of at-will employment for filing a workman's compensation claim, for 
serving on a jury, or for refusing to engage in an illegal activity. 
For the question answered by DeRose, however, an important new 
one was also posed. As noted, the Court refused to consider a tort 
measure of damages advanced by DeRose on appeal. 12 Although the 
Court did not reveal its thinking on whether tort damages would be 
6 DeRose, 398 Mass. at 210, 496 N.E.2d at 431. 
7 /d. at 212, 496 N.E.2d at 432 (citing Hall v. Paine, 224 Mass. 62, 68, 112 N.E. 153 
(1916) and 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 1077 (1951)). 
8 /d. at 212 n.7, 496 N.E.2d at 432 n.7. 
9 /d. at 213, 496 N .E.2d at 433. 
10 See Gram v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 668 n.6, 429 N.E.2d 21, 27 n.6 
(1981), where the Court observed that "[T]he general rule that an employee-at-will contract 
could be terminated at any time for any reason or no reason at all was regarded as well 
established until recently." 
11 384 Mass. 659, 668 n.6, 429 N.E.2d 21, 27 n.6 (1981). 
12 DeRose, 398 Mass. at 212, 496 N .E.2d at 432. 
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available if properly pleaded and tried, it dropped a tantalizing footnote 
in which it acknowledged without further comment that plaintiffs in other 
jurisdictions had been permitted to "seek liability in tort for violations of 
public policy. " 13 
The answer to this latest question in the emerging area of at-will 
employment litigation is significant. The Court has expressly noted that 
"[a] contract at will is not a contract for life or a term of years. Thus, 
there can be no recovery for future lost wages and benefits based on the 
contract at will."14 Accordingly, absent a tort measure of damages, any 
recovery for at-will plaintiffs discharged in violation of public policy 
would be relatively limited. 15 Likewise, the risks for an employer anxious 
to fire an at-will employee who, for example, refuses to lie for an em-
ployer, would be relatively low if limited contract damages constituted 
the employee's only resource. Conversely, the availability of tort dam-
ages could substantially increase the scope of employee recoveries in 
DeRose type case. The answer to the damage question, and with it the 
key to the future of the at-will employment litigation in Massachusetts, 
will likely be forthcoming soon. 
§ 12.7. The Use of Polygraph Testing on Employees. Debate, legislation, 
and litigation over attempts by public and private employers to obtain 
information through non-traditional means from and about their employ-
ees is likely to dominate the latter half of the 198Q's. In particular, issues 
will proliferate regarding the relative rights of employees and employers 
over urinalysis testing of employees for controlled substances and poly-
graph testing of employees for truthfulness of various pieces of infor-
mation which employers demand. During the Survey year an important 
amendment to the state's polygraph law, chapter 149, section 14B, be-
came effective. In Patch v. Mayor of Revere, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court 
summarized and further clarified the law regarding a police department's 
right to conduct polygraph tests on police officers during the course of a 
criminal investigation which arguably implicated the officers' fitness to 
perform their job duties. 
Prior to 1986, General Laws chapter 149, section 14B- encaptioned 
"Use of Lie Detector Tests by Employers Prohibited" - was purely a 
criminal statute. It imposed a $200 fine on employers who subjected 
employees or job applicants to a lie detector test. The law provided an 
13 Id. at 212 n.7, 469 N.E.2d at 432 n.7. 
14 Id. at 2ll n.4, 469 N.E.2d at 431 n.4. 
"Cf id. at 213, 469 N.E.2d at 433, where the Court, although upholding the jury's 
$9,000 verdict to DeRose, expressly refused to comment on the proper measure of the 
contract damages "in a case such as this." 
§ 12.7 1 397 Mass. 454, 492 N.E.2d 77 (1986). 
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exception, however, for testing permitted in the course of criminal in-
vestigations.2 By Chapter 587 of the Acts of 1985, effective in part on 
March 16, 1986, and in whole on September 30, 1986, the legislature 
increased the criminal sanctions in the polygraph law and added impor-
tant substantive rights for employees. The amended law expressly ren-
ders it unlawful for an employer either to request or subject employees,3 
or applicants for employment, to polygraph tests and/or "to discharge, 
not hire or demote or otherwise discriminate against" any such persons 
for asserting rights under the statute. Furthermore, the amendment, in 
an apparent attempt to close a loophole in the pre-existing statute, ex-
pressly extends the prohibition on polygraph testing to tests performed 
outside of Massachusetts but which related to employment within the 
state. The statute requires employers to include a notice on all applica-
tions for employment advising employees of the illegality of polygraph 
testing as a condition of employment. Finally, the amendment expressly 
creates a civil cause of action for any aggrieved person, authorizes the 
issuance of injunctive relief, treble damages, and attorney's fees for a 
prevailing party. 
By its amendment the legislature has spoken clearly and definitively 
on the public policy of the Commonwealth in the area of polygraph 
testing. It has simultaneously rendered moot speculation as to whether 
the courts would entertain a common law suit, grounded in a DeRose 
type theory,4 for discharge over a protected refusal to submit to polygraph 
testing. 
What the amendment did not do, however, was clarify the scope of 
the exception for polygraph testing of employees which "may be other-
wise permitted in criminal investigations. "5 Because the statute offers no 
insight into the nature of "otherwise permissible" polygraph testing done 
in conjuction with criminal investigations, the exception should continue 
to provide grist for litigation as it did during the Survey year. 
2 The statute provides: 
Any employer who subjects any person employed by him, or any person applying 
for employment, including any person applying for employment as a police officer, 
to a lie detector test, or requests, directly or indirectly, any such employee or 
applicant to take a lie detector test, shall be punished by a fine of not more than 
two hundred dollars. This section shall not apply to lie detector tests administered 
by law enforcement agencies as may be otherwise permitted in criminal investiga-
tions. 
G.L. c. 149, § 148. 
3 The exception for "lie detector tests administered by law enforcement agencies as may 
be otherwise permitted in criminal investigations" was also continued by the amendment. 
See G.L. c. 149, § 148(2). 
4 See supra § 9.6. 
5 G.L. c. 149, § 148(2). 
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Patch v. Mayor of Revere arose out of a criminal investigation by the 
Revere police department and the state police over allegations that certain 
Revere police officers had received advanced copies of a 1983 civil ser-
vice promotional examination for the rank of sergeant. The chief of the 
Revere police directed each of the suspected officers to take a polygraph 
test in connection with the ongoing investigation. Each officer refused 
the order on constitutional grounds, and a group of officers sought a 
preliminary injunction enjoining the polygraph testing. The superior court 
denied that request,6 and the Supreme Judicial Court granted the officers' 
request for direct appellate review. 
In a succinct opinion, the Court reviewed existing case law regarding 
the use of polygraph testing on police employees. As its premise, the 
Court first observed that "a public employer has authority to compel an 
employee, under threat of discharge for noncooperation, to answer ques-
tions reasonably related to the employee's ability and fitness to perform 
his [or her] official duties"7 and that "as a matter of constitutional prin-
ciple, any answers given to such questions may not be used against the 
employee in a criminal proceeding. "8 The Court noted further that it has 
held previously that the authority of a police department "to examine 
employees relative to allegations of criminal conduct is the same for both 
conventional and polygraph examinations. "9 Finally, the Court reiterated 
that because law enforcement agencies had been expressly exempted by 
the legislature from the prohibitions of chapter 149, section 14B, "there 
are no statutory 'restrictions on a police department's testing of its own 
employees' in the course of a criminal investigation. " 10 
Turning to the case at bar, the Court addressed the plaintiff's claim 
that sanctions for refusal to submit to a polygraph test violated due 
process rights protected by the state and federal constitutions, a claim 
which the Court acknowledged it had not addressed in prior decisions. 11 
With respect to substantive due process, the Court concluded that the 
demand that the officers submit to a lie detector test under the facts of 
the case was not so irrational as to violate the applicable constitutional 
protections. The Court suggested by analogy that the threshold of un-
6 The superior court judge did, however, condition the testing on certain procedural 
safeguards including: service of the advance notice as to the subject matter of the test; a 
grant of "use" immunity to each officer; assurance that the test be conducted by a com-
petent, independent examiner; and service on each officer of the test material and exam-
iner's report. See Patch, 397 Mass. at 455 n.3, 492 N.E.2d at 78 n.3. 
7 /d. (citations omitted). 
• /d. (citations omitted and emphasis added). 
9 /d. at 456, 492 N.E.2d at 79 (citing Baker v. Lawrence, 379 Mass. 322, 332, 409 N.E.2d 
710 (1979)). 
10 !d. 
11 Patch, 397 Mass. at 457, 492 N.E.2d at 79. 
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constitutionality in substantive due process grounds was something akin 
to trial by ordeal Y 
As to the issue of procedural due process, the Court was similarly 
unimpressed. The opinion stated that the plaintiffs had a statutory right, 
onder the civil law, to a pretermination hearing. The Court reasoned, 
therefore, that the plaintiffs had a forum in which to raise any objection 
to the imposition of discipline ensuing from polygraph results. Although 
the Court noted that it saw no "fatal objection" 13 to such use of polygraph 
results by the police department on the record before it, the civil service 
hearing would provide an opportunity to explore the issue more fully, 
and thus satisfy procedural due process requirements. 
The Court in Patch indicated that it did not have to decide whether 
failure to comply with an order to submit to a polygraph examination 
"could after a hearing by itself be 'just cause' to discharge a police 
officer. "14 It expressly limited its decision to holding that "due process 
does not require that the mayor and chief of police be enjoined from 
insisting that the plaintiffs comply with properly issued orders directing 
them to submit to polygraph examinations."15 There are compelling in-
dications within the Court's opinion, however, that a police officer can 
be terminated for refusing to take a duly ordered and suitably limited 
polygraph exam given in conjunction with a good faith criminal investi-
gation. It is also probable from its dicta that the Court would permit the 
discharge of a police officer who had enjoyed a pretermination hearing 
on the basis of evidence elicited from the polygraph exam. 
What remains unanswered, however, is whether the Patch Court's 
analysis of the rights of police officers who are ordered to take a poly-
graph exam as part of an ongoing criminal investigation, applies with 
equal force to non-police public employees who are similarly ordered to 
undergo such an exam. More particularly stated, does the polygraph 
examination of a public employee, other than a police officer, conducted 
by a law enforcement agency in the course of a criminal investigation 
qualify under the "otherwise permitted" exception to the statutory pro-
hibition against polygraph testing in chapter 149, section 14B? 
The evidence of the Court's view on this question is equivocal. AI-
12 Id. Whether or not the imposition of a polygraph test upon threat of job sanctions 
violates substantive due process, the reference to trial by ordeal as the standard against 
which the question is to be answered is seemingly anachronistic. It does not appear that 
in the 1980's a public employee must show that his feet are about to be scalded by hot 
coals as a test of his fitness for duty before obtaining constitutional relief. For some years 
now even a convicted murderer need not have shown that the State planned to burn him 
at the stake in order to invoke protection against cruel and unusual punishment. 
13 /d. 
14 /d. at 458, 492 N.E.2d at 80. 
15 /d. 
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though all relevant cases decided by the Court have involved the poly-
graph testing of police officers, 16 the language employed in the seminal 
case, Baker v. Lawrence, 17 suggested that the exception within section 
14B was not limited solely to the testing of police officers. Thus, in 
discussing the principles of law applicable to its decision, the Court 
offered the following explanation of section 14B: 
The second sentence propounds an exception to the first. The situation 
plainly within the exception is one where a law enforcement agency is 
conducting an investigation into a crime alleged to have been committed 
by a person in connection with the duties of his employment, and the 
agency is permitted, i.e., not forbidden, to administer a polygraph test to 
that employee. If, then, the employee refuses or indicates hesitance to 
submit to the test at the agency's request, the employer (relieved of the 
prohibition of the first sentence of § 19B) may request that the employee 
do so, with implied job sanctions if the employee finally declines .... 
The legislature, although generally averse to tests forced by employers 
upon their employees, here recognized an evident interest of the employer 
in applying some pressure to assist an investigation leading to exoneration 
of the employee or the opposite. 18 
The Court's frequent reference to "person" or "employee," without 
limiting the scope of its explanation to the position of police officer, 
appears to suggest that it views section 14B as a clause of general appli-
cation to all employees. Such a reading of section 14B, however, would 
also seem to dilute substantially the protection the statute affords non-
police employees. Although polygraph testing of applicants for employ-
ment seems logically to fall outside the criminal investigation exception, 
the resort to testing current employees more likely than not will arise 
from a theft or similar occurrence which is criminal in nature. Thus, by 
reporting the alleged crime to a law enforcement agency, the employer 
could force tests upon current employees without fear of violating the 
statute. Very little, it seems, would be left out of the statutory protection 
for persons once employed. 
If Patch is instructive at all on this point, it is for its retreat from 
Baker's general language to language which focuses solely upon the right 
of a police department to test its own officers in furtherance of an ongoing 
criminal investigation. When commenting on the right to obtain infor-
mation from employees through means other than polygraphy, the Court 
again used the terms employer and employees in a generic sense. When 
discussing its prior holdings under section 14B, however, the Court's 
language was noticeably more circumspect. 19 
16 See, e.g., Local 346, Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 391 
Mass. 429, 462 N.E.2d 96 (1984). 
17 379 Mass. 322, 409 N.E.2d 710 (1979). 
18 /d. at 327-28, 409 N.E.2d at 713-14 (emphasis added). 
19 The specific language is: 
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In light of the Court's language in Patch, which is focused on police 
officers, and its citation to Baker in support of that language, the most 
that can be said from the case law at this point is that the exception in 
section 14B permits a police department to test its own police officers 
by polygraph when the department is investigating an alleged crime. 
Whether the exception applies to non-police employees remains an open 
question. 
§ 12.8. The Amendment to Chapter 150E. In the private sector, the 
balance of bargaining power between labor and management is in large 
measure preserved by management's right, upon reaching a good faith 
impasse, to implement the terms of a final offer.' Labor's corresponding 
right is to strike in support of its contract demands. 2 In Massachusetts, 
chapter 150E, governing public employees, has preserved the employer's 
right to implement its last offer upon impasse,3 but has strictly prohibited 
public employees from striking over contract demands. 4 In place of the 
right to strike, chapter 150E requires the public employer to engage in a 
fact-finding proceeding over unresolved bargaining issues, and to engage 
in post fact-finding negotiations, with the aid of the fact-finder's report, 
in an attempt to reach agreement. 5 
Because the Legislature specifically excepted law enforcement agencies from the 
prohibitions of G.L. c. 149, § 19B (1984 ed.), there are no statutory "restrictions of 
a police department's testing of its own employees in the course of criminal inves-
tigations." Local 346, Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 391 
Mass. 429, 440-41, 462 N.E.2d 96 (1984). 
We have noted that, despite limitations on the evidential use of its results in 
criminal proceedings, polygraph testing may further both the proper needs of certain 
criminal investigations and the public's interest in preserving the credibility and the 
integrity of its police force. See Local 346, Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers v. Labor 
Relations Comm'n, 391 Mass. 429, 439-44, 462 N.E.2d 96 (1984); Baker v. Lawrence, 
supra 379 Mass. at 328 nn. 9 & ll, 409 N.E.2d 710 .... 
Our cases have suggested that refusal to submit to an examination, whether by 
polygraph or otherwise, would constitute good cause to discharge a tenured police 
officer. See Local 346, lnt'l Bhd. of Police Officers v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 
supra 391 Mass. at 440-41, 462 N.E.2d 96; Baker v. Lawrence, supra, 379 Mass. at 
332, 409 N.E.2d 719; Silverio v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 355 Mass. 
623, 630, 247 N.E.2d 379, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 878, 90S. Ct. 141, 25 L.Ed.2d 135 
(1969). 
Patch, 397 Mass. at 457, 492 N.E.2d at 79. 
§ 12.8 1 See NLRB v. Almeida Bus Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 729 (1st Cir. 1964). 
2 See the Labor Relations Management Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 163 
which states: "Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall 
be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to 
strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." 
3 See Hanson School Committee, 5 MCL 1671 (1979). 
4 See G.L. c. 150E, § 9A(a). 
5 See id. 
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Because the fact-finder's report is not binding on either party, however, 
labor generally regards the fact-finding process as an inadequate substi-
tute for the right to strike. Moreover, because the employer's right to 
implement its last offer attached upon reaching impasse- a state reached 
prior to fact-finding6 - unions could and have been faced with post fact-
finding negotiations in the face of a fait accompli. Any value that fact-
finding might otherwise have had as an equalizer in the area of bargaining 
power was obviously subject to dissipation by the public employer's 
lawful, pre-emptive imposition of its final order. 
During the Survey year the legislature, although preserving the strike 
prohibition, amended chapter 150E in an effort to reduce the employer 
advantage in the bargaining power equation. Specifically, the legislature 
amended chapter 150E, section 9,7 by adding the following paragraph: 
Upon the filing of a petition pursuant to this section for a determination 
of an impasse following negotiations for a successor agreement, an em-
ployer shall not implement unilateral changes until the collective bargaining 
process, including mediation, fact-finding or arbitration, if applicable, shall 
have been completed and the terms and conditions of employment shall 
continue in effect until the collective bargaining process, including media-
tion, fact-finding, or arbitration, if applicable, shall have been completed; 
provided, however, that nothing contained herein shall prohibit the parties 
from extending the terms and conditions of such a collective bargaining 
agreement by mutual agreement for a period of time in excess of the 
aforementioned time. For purposes of this paragraph, the board shall certify 
to the parties that the collective bargaining process, including mediation, 
fact-finding or arbitration, if applicable, has been completed.8 
By prohibiting the public employer from implementing any unilateral 
changes in contractual terms until the completion of fact-finding, the 
statute advances the bargaining power of the unions in at least two ways. 
First, where the employer's bargaining agenda includes time sensitive 
proposals for change, there is greater likelihood that the employer will 
be willing to compromise in order to achieve its proposal quickly, know-
ing that lack of agreement will result in a lengthy delay for the mediation 
and fact-finding process. Second, even where time sensitive proposals 
are not paramount, it is simply easier for a union to bargain successfully 
6 /d. Paragraph four of § 9 states, inter alia, that "if the impasse continues after the 
conclusion of mediation, either party ... may petition ... to initiate factfinding." See also 
Moses v. Labor Relations Commission, 389 Mass. 920,452 N.E.2d l117 (1983), where thr 
Court expressly ruled that a public employer may implement its last offer following impasse 
even though factfinding has not yet been conducted. 
7 Chapter 198 of the Acts of 1986 amended§ 9 as quoted above. As well, that amendment 
empowered a mediator to order that the parties provide specific representatives authorized 
to enter into collective bargaining agreements be present at bargaining meetings designed 
to end an impasse. 
8 G.L. c. lOSE, § 9. 
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before the employer has implemented changes than it is after the change 
has become effective.9 
Although it is too early to predict the impact that the amendment will 
have on the bargaining process, it is at least possible, if not probable, 
that collective bargaining agreements will be more quickly resolved as a 
result of greater balance in the parties' bargaining power. In any event, 
even without the right to strike, the public unions are assuredly better 
off because of the amendment. 
9 For this reason the Commission, upon finding that an employer unilaterally changed 
employment conditions prior to impasse, will normally order the changes rescinded as part 
of its overall remedy. See School Comm. of Newton v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 388 
Mass. 557, 447 N.E.2d 1201 (1983). 

